(Article of periodic en Anglais - 2014)

Document title

The economic development incentives game : an imperfect information, heterogeneous communities approach

Authors(s) and Affiliation(s)


  • DepT. of Economics Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State Univ., Atlanta, ETATS-UNIS


The economic development incentives game developed in this paper extends the basic incentives game framework utilized in previous research by: (1) assuming heterogeneous communities with a priori unknown (to the communities or the firm) benefits and costs associated with the location, (2) providing a mechanism for communities to discover their true benefits and costs, and (3) allowing firms, as well as communities, to experience consequences associated with accepting a ‘bad deal’. Modeling an incentives competition game with these elements generates equilibrium behaviors and payoffs consistent with those observed in empirical and case studies


Article of periodic

published at : The Annals of regional science / ISSN 0570-1864

Editor : Springer, Berlin - ALLEMAGNE (1967)

Millesime : 2014, vol. 53, no1 [pp. 137-156]

Bibliographic references : 61 ref.

Collation : fig., tabl., cartes



Digital Object Identifier

Go to electronic document thanks to its DOI : doi:10.1007/s00168-014-0621-5

Tous droits réservés © Prodig - Bibliographie Géographique Internationale (BGI), 2014
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